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Abstract. Advanced machine learning and natural
language techniques enable attackers to launch sophis-
ticated and targeted social engineering based attacks.
To counter the active attacker issue, researchers have
since resorted to proactive methods of detection. Email
masquerading using targeted emails to fool the victim
is an advanced attack method. However automatic
text generation requires controlling the context and
coherency of the generated content, which has been
identified as an increasingly difficult problem. The
method used leverages a hierarchical deep neural model
which uses a learned representation of the sentences
in the input document to generate structured written
emails. We demonstrate the generation of short and
targeted text messages using the deep model. The
global coherency of the synthesized text is evaluated
using a qualitative study as well as multiple quantitative
measures.
Keywords. Bidirectional LSTM, Doc2Vec embeddings,
Proactive defense, natural language generation (NLG).
1 Introduction
Adversarial learning is a major threat to the
field of computer security research. With
the advancement in technology, the growing
dependency on the Internet has exposed users
to serious cyber threats like phishing and
pharming. Despite considerable research to
counter such threats, staggering numbers of
individuals and organizations fall prey to targeted
social engineering attacks incurring huge financial
losses.
Although attackers change their strategies,
previous research [4] has shown that electronic
mails (emails) are a popular attack vector.
Emails can be embedded with a variety of
malign elements [11] like poisoned URLs to
malicious websites, malware attachments as well
as executables, documents, image files, etc.
Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) reports
over 270,5001 unique phishing email campaigns
received in the 3rd quarter of 2018, rising from a
total of around 233,6002 unique reports identified
in the 4th quarter of 2017. Phishing reports
also reveal the consistent rise in phishing attacks
targeted towards financial institutions like payment
processing firms and the banking sector. The
statistics demonstrate how the threat is worsening
as attackers continue to devise more sophisticated
(and maybe more effective) ways of scamming
victims.
Innovative and unseen attack vectors can trick
pre-trained classification techniques [37], thus
placing the victim at risk. In email masquerading
attacks, attackers after compromising the email
account of an individual can carefully construct a
fraudulent email then sent to the contacts known
to the compromised individual. This has serious
implications, because the attacker has gained
uninterrupted access to the inbox, outbox and
other private details of the compromised person.
Thus by exercising caution, the attacker can
emulate the content and context of the emails
1http://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg trends report q3 2018.pdf
2http://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg trends report q4 2017.pdf
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written by the individual and can communicate with
his contacts as a legitimate entity, successfully
evading detection and causing harm to the victim.
However, construction of the perfect deceptive
email requires fine-tuning and manual supervision.
While a fake mail constructed manually by an
attacker can guarantee a higher chance of
success, the process is both time and labor
intensive. In contrast, an automated text generator
can be trained to synthesize targeted emails much
faster and in bulk, thereby increasing the odds
of a successful attack. However, the bottleneck
in this case, lies in whether the system can
generate high quality text, free from common flags
like misspellings, incorrect and abusive language,
over-usage of action verbs, etc., which can be
picked up by a classifier easily. Thus, proactive
research in this area of deception based attacks
using email masquerading techniques requires
further sophisticated experimentation.
Advances in the field of natural language pro-
cessing have introduced newer and sophisticated
algorithms which enable a machine to learn and
generate high-quality textual content on a given
context. Grammar based tools like the Dada
Engine [2], N-gram language models [7] as well as
deep neural learners [44] have been used to study
and replicate natural language based attacks. The
aim is to facilitate proactive research by predicting
newer attacks and reinforce against such unseen
yet impending threats.
At the hands of an attacker, language generation
techniques can become dangerous tools for
deception. With access to proper training data,
deep learning neural networks are capable of
generating textual content. This property has
been leveraged by researchers for generating
tweets [36] and poetry [15], [43], etc. While limited,
proactive research has been pursued by using
deep learners for generation of fake reviews [44],
grammar based techniques [2] as well as simplistic
deep networks [9] have been leveraged for email
generation. Thus, we can assume that it is not long
before phishers and even spammers resort to such
techniques to generate newer kinds of malicious
attack vectors.
Following a proactive mode of study, we identify
the underlying implications of how an automated
machine learning technique, here, deep learners
can be leveraged to synthesize email bodies for
the purpose of email masquerading attacks. Along
with demonstrating the systems’ performance
using qualitative and quantitative methods, we
study the effectiveness and practicality of such
systems by comparing a hierarchical deep network
with a baseline word prediction model. Our key
contributions are as follows:
— A collection of the most common signals that
set apart a malicious email from its legitimate
counterpart (Section 2.1) as mentioned in
previous literature [40], [11], [14] on analyzing
phishing emails. We focus on cues that
are more prevalent in email bodies for our
evaluation. This is necessary to observe the
quality of the system generated emails.
— Leveraging deep neural networks for generat-
ing targeted email bodies (Section 2.3). While
generation of coherent emails is challeng-
ing [9], we use a hierarchical network that
consists of two stages - an architecture which
uses a word prediction model to generate
probable candidate sentences which are then
passed onto a sentence selection model,
based on distributed vector representations
of the email content, to select the best
possible set of sentences. Such a two-staged
architecture should be suitable for generating
longer content while maintaining coherency.
— Comparing the performance of the hierarchical
system with a baseline word prediction based
model by using multiple quantitative and
qualitative metrics (Section 4). Additionally,
we analyze the effectiveness of our system
by measuring the syntactical correctness,
coherency, fluency and legitimacy of the fake
emails by conducting a human evaluation.
2 Background
This section presents a list of cues usually
observed in spoofing emails that demarcate such
attack vectors from their legitimate counterparts.
Highlighting and studying such common signals
helped us prepare, process and evaluate our
training data as well as the generated emails.
The goal of the method is defined after studying
the common features in malicious emails, followed
by a detailed description and demonstration of
the baseline word prediction and the hierarchical
sentence selection models used for the generation
task.
2.1 Textual features in spoofing emails
Use of textual features, like presence of common
action words, organization names, poisoned links
to malicious webpages of financial institutions,
grammatical errors, etc., is common in phishing
email detection methods [40], [41], [39]. Moreover,
researchers have widely studied spam, phishing,
spear phishing emails to identify common signs
that appear across malicious emails [11], [14].
However, since such signals are certain signs of
malign intent an attacker would consciously avoid
incorporating these words in a targeted email.
Assuming this in mind, the generator should also
learn to identify and eliminate overuse of such
words.
Therefore, we curate a list of textual
cues frequently used in spoofing emails
after careful review of phishing email
literature [11], [40], [41], [39], [14], [6]. The
list of these textual cues along with examples have
been provided in Table 1. Researchers prefer to
train their proposed detection methods on publicly
available data. Since phishing emails are fairly
rare, we base our evaluation on the largest publicly
available dataset of malicious emails: Nazario
Phishing Corpus.3 The Base-64 encoded HTML
content in the emails are filtered out and finally
3,392 fairly clean emails with textual content (>10
words) are used to extract the enlisted spoofing
cues.
While machine learning systems can detect
common cues, these detectors largely depend
on historical data. To keep up with advanced
reinforcement techniques, a phisher also resorts
to employing sophisticated techniques for making
their attacks more targeted to increase rate of
success. Thus, for social engineering based
attacks like email masquerading, spear phishing,
3 https://monkey.org/˜jose/phishing/
Table 1. Common Spoofing Cues in Phishing Email
bodies
Feature Types Examples
Organization Names
(a) Financial like eBay, PayPal, Bank of America,
Western Union
(b) Government like Internal Revenue services,
United Parcel Service
(c) Software like Dell, Microsoft, Apple
Action Verbs and
Urgency Adverbs
(a) Action verbs like click, follow, visit, go, update,
apply, submit, confirm, cancel, dispute, enroll,
login, answer, reply
(b) Adverbs implying urgency like today, instantly,
straightaway, straight, directly, once,
urgently, desperately, immediately, soon, shortly,
presently, before, ahead, front
Persuasion Principles
(a) Authority like an email from a bank asking the
victim to update password of his online account
(b) Social proof denoted by Emails from
the IT department of the target’s institution
(c) Distraction using emails where a target
is tempted to click a link in order to
receive a prize
(d) Reciprocation appealing the victim to respond
like resetting a password or paying a bill
by clicking a link to a fraudulent website
Misspelled Words Typographical errors like Paypl, Bnk Amrica, etc.
Presence of Links URLs to malicious websiteslike https://www.maybank2u.com.my, etc.
Other languages Non-English words like Aviso Importante de BBVA,societe, Transaktionen
or targeted phishing, an attacker may choose
to avoid such easily identifiable red flags while
generating fake emails. Therefore, in our proactive
study, we also refrain from overuse of such
spoofing cues in the synthesized emails.
2.2 Task Description
Email masquerading is steadily growing into a
serious cybersecurity threat and has started
gaining much attention from security researchers.
This paper aims at providing a proactive paradigm
to this issue. Some of the key questions are:
Given a large dataset of manually written emails,
can an automated system learn to emulate the
writing style of a human? Is the generated email
content coherent and syntactic? Can an individual
differentiate between a system generated email
and a manually written one?
The hierarchical model is compared with a
baseline word generation architecture. Further-
more, the system performance is studied using
multiple quantitative metrics along with a qualitative
evaluation conducted through a human survey.
2.3 Architecture for Text Generation
Textual content can be considered as a sequence
of words and characters placed together to convey
meaningful information. In the realm of text
generation, deep neural architectures have seen
unprecedented success in emulating one’s writing
when trained on huge amounts of written textual
content [44], [15], [38].
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) are ca-
pable of retaining information learned from text
sequences – helpful for learning representations
of word sequences in the input text. The
trained language model can subsequently gener-
ate samples similar in form and context to the
input data. We leverage this ability of RNNs
for our proactive protection scheme - generation
of targeted emails suitable for spear-phishing or
masquerading attacks. Moreover, Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM) Networks, an improved
version of RNN, have proved to be better at
handling dependencies in longer sequences of
text [27], [44].
The architectures use words as units for
generation [43], [21] by leveraging LSTMs as
building blocks for learning the language model.
We use a hierarchical model that merges sentence
selection with iterative text generation to generate
the best set of human readable samples. We
compare the architecture, sampling and generation
phases for these two architectures followed by an
evaluation of their performance.
2.3.1 Training a Word Prediction Model.
Our first model is a straightforward word-based
language model built using RNNs [43]. In
our implementation, we use Bidirectional LSTMs
(Bi-LSTMs) [19] as the network to build the
model. Figure 1 shows the overall model for
word prediction. We describe the training and
generation phases for this baseline generation
architecture.
Training Phase. We use Bidirectional LSTMs
(Bi-LSTMs) as our network for text generation
model. The input to our text generation system are
one-hot vector sequences of words (w0, w1, w2, ...,
wN−1) where N is the sequence length. At every
time step t (starting with 0), we feed a word (wt)
into the hidden layer which predicts the next word
wt+1. Through error optimization, the model learns
to capture the best representation of coherent word
sequences that constitute the textual content to be
generated - in this case, the body of an email.
Generation Phase and Temperature
Regulation. During the generation phase,
we feed a sequence (N ) of seed words
(Wseed0 ,Wseed1 ,Wseed2 , ...,WseedN ) into the
trained Bi-LSTM model, used to start off the
word generation system. When the model gets a
seed word (Wseed0 ) as input, it outputs the next
word (W1) by selecting the one most likely to
occur after Wseed0 depending on the conditional
probability distribution, P (W1|Wseed0). When this
aforementioned step is extended for an input
sequence of N seeds, the model (Figure 1) can
generate a text body of N + 1 words, the N + 1th
word being the output.
The final layer of the model, which calculates the
above conditional probability, is a softmax normal-
ization which is used for computing the distribution
for the next word followed by subsequent sampling.
We use temperature(τ) as the hyper-parameter
for selecting our word samples - regulating the
parameter τ in Equation 1 encourages or controls
the diversity of the generated text. The novelty
or eccentricity of the generative model can be
evaluated by varying the temperature parameter
between 0 < Temp. ≤ 1.0. While, lower values of
τ generate relatively deterministic samples, higher
values can make the process more stochastic.
Equation 1 shows the probability distribution
built by the model for the sequences of words
along with the incorporation of temperature control
parameter(τ ) P (Wt+1|Wt′≤t) = softmax(Wt),
P (softmax(W jt )) =
e
W
j
t
τ∑n
j=1 e
W
j
t
τ
(1)
2.3.2 Hierarchical Sentence Prediction Model.
Controlling global coherency and structure in
automated text generation is a non-trivial task.
Using a straightforward word prediction model
makes it increasingly difficult to control the quality
as well as coherency of the generated text. We use
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an hierarchical model [10] consisting of two stages
- generation of sentence candidates4 followed by
sentence selection model. For the sentence
selection model, we use Doc2Vec [26] embeddings
to learn representations of the email bodies, where
each email is treated as a document. Given a set
of sentences as starting point, we describe how the
trained Doc2Vec model is used to generate a new
sentence.
Sentence Selection using Doc2Vec. Use of
embeddings has been regarded as a favorable way
to represent context in a piece of text, either in the
form of word phrases, sentences or paragraphs.
Doc2Vec [26] can effectively learn the numeric
representation of a paragraph or even a document,
irrespective of its length. In this model, we use
Doc2Vec to learn better representations of the
sentences in a piece of text - for example, the body
of an email. Figure 2 shows the stages of the
sentence selection model. The model starts with
training a Doc2Vec model on the entire document.
The goal is to predict the next sentence (here,
its vector representation) given a sequence of
sentences as starting point. As shown in Figure 2,
using the trained Doc2Vec model, we vectorize a
set of seed sentences and then feed the vectors to
the Bi-LSTM layer in order to learn the model for
sentence prediction.
4sequences of words highly likely to appear together in a
sentence in email body
Generation of Sentence Candidates. The
first stage deals with the generation of a set of
candidate sentences and/or phrases. The input
to the whole model is a set of seed sentence
sequences. The first level of the network is
a trained word prediction model which takes as
input the last N words from the given seed
sentences. The model architecture is same
as the one described in Section 2.3.1. This
sequence of N words is used to generate a set
of candidate sentences which are transformed
into their Doc2Vec vector representations for
comparison and selection.
Generation of newer sentences. The seed
sentences are fed into the trained Bi-LSTM-based
Doc2Vec model for sentence selection. This
constitutes the second stage of the hierarchical
architecture and selects the best sentence vector
depending on the input sequences. The generated
vector is then compared with the selected
candidate sentences - output of first level using
a cosine similarity function. The most similar
candidate is then produced as output of the
hierarchical generation model.
Generation phase and Temperature Regula-
tion. The parameters used and the purpose
for temperature regulation during the generation
phase using the hierarchical model is similar to
the generation phase explained in Section 2.3.1.
The selected best sentence from the generated
candidate sentences or phrases are merged with
the sequence of input seeds and fed into the model
to generate newer sentences.
Therefore, the complete hierarchical or multi-
stage architecture has been shown in Figure 3.
The sequence of sentences, called seed sen-
tences (Sent1, Sent2, ..., SentN ), are first chosen
as input to be given to two pre-trained models
- one, a word-based language model and the
other a model trained on Doc2Vec embeddings
of sentences in documents. The word-based
language model uses a sequence of the last N
words from the given sentences as input. It
then outputs the most probable word to appear
in the N + 1th position based on the trained
model. The model repeats this step in a feedback
setup to generate sequences of sentences.
These generated sentence sequences are called
candidate sentences. We refer to these generated
candidate sentences as Sentcand1, Sentcand2, ...,
SentcandX .5
The seed sentences (Sent1, Sent2, ..., SentN )
are converted to their Doc2Vec embedding vectors
– Sentd2v1, Sentd2v2, ..., Sentd2vN – using the
trained Doc2Vec vector transformation model.
These sentence vector representations are then
fed into the BiLSTM-based sentence selection
model which had been trained on sentence embed-
dings using Doc2Vec representations (Figure 2).
Given a sequence of sentence embeddings, this
model selects the most suitable sentence vector to
follow the given sequence.
In the final step, we compare each generated
candidate sentence to the selected sentence
vector. To explain this step, we select the candidate
sentence Sentcand2 and convert it into its Doc2Vec
representation (Sentcand−d2v2). The selected
sentence vector from the Doc2Vec sentence
selection model given the N seed sentences
is Sentd2vN+1. We use the Cosine similarity
metric to calculate the similarity between the two
vectors Sentcand−d2v2 and Sentd2vN+1. This step
is repeated for all the candidate sentences and
the sentence candidates with the highest similarity
values are then chosen as the output of the model.
5X refers to the number of candidates to be generated.
3 Data Collection and Setup
A large amount of high quality data is required
for text generation. This becomes crucial when
automating the composition skill and pattern of
an individual. Here, we describe the source and
collection steps of the data used in the email body
generation task.
3.1 Data Collection
To produce the best sample to emulate a
targeted attack, the trained generation model
must synthesize an email body similar to an
email composed by the individual whose writing
style it is trying to emulate. Thus, for training
our model we make use of the largest publicly
available source of legitimate emails, the Enron
Corpus [12]. Table 2 summarizes the statistics
about our dataset. We evaluate the average
number of sentences, average vocabulary as well
as average number of words in a typical email body.
The step-wise data collection process along with
the data preparation and pre-processing steps are
given below.
Building the dataset of legitimate emails.
We use the largest publicly available dataset
of benign emails - Enron Corpus.6 Since we
aim at synthesizing the writing style of humans,
it is necessary to make the process of email
masquerading more effective. For building our
training and evaluation dataset, we make use
of ‘legitimate’ emails which we collect based on
the following assumptions. We assume that the
emails that an individual, within Enron, receives
are legitimate i.e., they have been identified as
benign by the mail server. Also, the emails that
the individual sends out are also benign. The
Enron corpus consists of a large number of emails
ranging from spam, deleted advertisements, etc.,
which is useless for training purposes. Hence,
for our purpose, we use emails from two types of
email directories - the Inbox (Received folder) and
Outbox (Sent folder) of the individuals within Enron
corpus.
6https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/enron_mail_
20150507.tar.gz
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The collection process involved the following
steps: (a) We use the collection of 517,401
emails from the publicly available Enron corpus;
(b) We choose the emails that are composed of
a minimum of 10 words and contain a minimum of
one sentence; (c) We also calculate the average
statistics of the dataset to determine the generic
length, number of words, vocabulary size of the
emails we plan to synthesize.
Table 2. Legitimate Data Statistics
Attributes Values
Dataset Size 517,401
Total Number of Words 167,692,695
Avg. Number of Words 324
Total Vocabulary 2,028,671
Avg. Vocabulary 143
Avg. Sentence Length 25
Total Number of Sentences 6,590,091
Avg. Number of Sentences 13
3.2 Assumptions and Data Preprocessing
We assume a typical scenario where the attacker
has compromised and gained access to the mail
account, all email communication, personal details,
email contact list, etc.
Our primary focus is on the automated
generation of textual content of the body of
an email. Hence, we do not account for the
generation or evaluation of header information in
an email. Moreover, we also do not consider the
generation of email attachments, links or email
addresses that maybe present in the body. The
goal is to make the synthesized email content
more generic to allow inclusion of personalized
information like named entities, location names,
etc., depending on the communication between
the victim and the compromised individual. Also,
from the architectural viewpoint, including named
entities, personalized details, etc., is unnecessary
during training phase and will eventually blow up
the vocabulary of our word-based architecture,
therefore confusing it. To avoid the inclusion of
unnecessary word tokens and to generalize the
context, we replace the named entities in the email
bodies with the ent tags - this includes replacing
person names as well as locations (if applicable).
We use the Entity Recognizer Module implemented
in SpaCy for Python 3.6 for entity tagging and
replacement.
In most cases, the body of the Emails contain
elements which are of little or no value to our
training and evaluation process. We apply the
following pre-processing steps to clean our data
while making sure not to delete any important
information:
— We remove all trailing spaces, newline
characters, etc., from the text body
— Replacement of named entities (person,
location, etc.) with ent tag
— We replace Email addresses in the body with
emailID tag
— Replacement of URL links with the link tag
— Adding the Start of Text (<SOT>) and End
of Text (<EOT>) tags to the email bodies to
respectively mark the beginning and end of the
content.
— Sanitization of non-ASCII characters from the
text
— Removal of HTML text fragments and broken
links from text body
— We also lowercase our textual content and
remove special characters like #, $, %, , etc.
3.3 System Setup and Methodology
The system was developed in Python 3.6 using
Keras (Version 2.2.4) and TensorFlow (Version
1.11.0). In our experimental evaluation, the LSTM
network consists of 128 hidden units, since we
are using Bi-LSTMs, the total number of states is
256. We consider an unrolling size of 15, i.e., the
network looks back up to a sequence of 15 words
to predict the next probable word. Among the other
hyperparameters, we consider a batch size of 50
with a learning rate 10−2. Each architecture was
trained for a total of 50 epochs for building the
language model.
The above set of hyperparameters has been
chosen based on our empirical evaluation as
explained in this section. We considered a
hyperparameter optimization scheme where we
look at the GridSearch technique provided by the
Scikit-Learn library. We tune the networks for batch
sizes 35, 50, 75 and epochs of 10, 20 and 50. We
also experiment with LSTM hidden units of 128 and
256. We choose these values since the training
time is much more reasonable. We manually
selected the unrolling size length by experimenting
with values between 10 to 25 in increments of
5 units. Similarly, the learning rate (10−2) was
selected after running the algorithm with learning
rates of 10−3, 10−2 and 10−1.
All our experiments were conducted on a server
with 4 Tesla M10 GPUs using CUDA (Version
9.1.85) with a 3.20GHz Xeon CPU E5-2667
and 512 GB of memory. We use Adam [25]
algorithm for the gradient optimization in the
word-based as well as the Doc2Vec language
modeling architectures. For the calculation of the
loss functions, we use categorical crossentropy
for the word-based model and a regression based
loss function, Log-Cosh for learning the model for
Doc2Vec embeddings.
For the word prediction model, the starting seed
of 15 words were chosen randomly from a set
of starting sentences in the email bodies. For
generating text using the hierarchical architecture,
the system was given a set of candidate sentences
comprising of the first sentence of 10 randomly
selected legitimate emails from the Enron corpus.
4 System Evaluation and Analysis
This section describes the experimental setup for
the training and generation phases of the baseline
and deep generation model. The evaluation setup
for analyzing system performance based on the
quantitative and qualitative nature of the generated
content as well as their practical implications have
been discussed in detail.
4.1 Evaluation Setup
For our evaluation setup, we use a total dataset of
517,140 emails. We set apart 5% of the dataset
for validation during training and the rest was used
for training the model. The separate training and
validation subsets are crucial for determining the
performance of our prediction model on unrelated
data. We train the deep generative models each
for 50 epochs with the validation of the model
performance after every epoch, finally selecting
and saving the model that achieves the best
performance on validation data.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate the performance of the generative
model along three dimensions: (a) a quantitative
evaluation using a word-gram based measure of
overlap and uniqueness between the synthesized
and the targeted email bodies as well as model
perplexity; (b) a simple qualitative evaluation
where we inspect the samples generated by the
generative word-based and hierarchical models
by selecting some samples; and finally, (c) a
human evaluation which consists of a survey with
6 participants providing feedback on the overall
syntax, coherency, and fluency of the synthesized
email bodies as compared to their legitimate
counterparts.
4.2.1 Quantitative Evaluation
Measure of model perplexity is an established
method to determine the ability of a lan-
guage model. We compare the perplexity
of the word-based model (Generatorword) with
the deep hierarchical sentence selection model
(Generatorsentence). A lower perplexity ensures a
more stable predictive ability. Model perplexity is
defined as:
PPL = 2
NLL
T (2)
Here, NLL refers to negative log likelihood of the
model and T is the length of the training sequence
for which the model perplexity is measured. A more
detailed definition for a word-based generation
model:
PPL = 2−
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 log(P (Wt+1|W0...Wt)) (3)
During our second phase of quantitative evalua-
tion, we use a novel metric to observe the se-
mantic coherence across the generated samples.
Coherency in an email should account for the
adequacy in information between the sentences or
even words in the email body [27]. Taking into
account the mutual information between a word
and its predecessors in the sentence to calculate
semantic coherence, we can define the following
measure:
Coherence =
1
T
∑
t
(log pfwd(wt|wt−1)+
log pbwd(wt−1|wt))
(4)
The mutual information between two words acts
as a measure of how likely it is for the words to
appear together in the context, thus a higher value
of mutual information means better coherence [20].
We take into account both the forward as well as
the backward probabilities of occurrence of the
bigrams (wt,wt−1). To control the influence of the
length of the generated text, the values are scaled
by the total length (i.e., number of words) of the
generated sentence/sequence.
Measuring perplexity can provide a false sense
of language model’s performance - while a low
value denotes the model’s ability to replicate the
input text; it may emulate the characteristics of
the input text too much. To measure the overlap
between the generated and targeted email text,
we consider the ratio of common word-N-grams
between the ground-truth (or legitimate) email and
its ‘fake’ counterpart. For evaluation purposes, we
select N = 3, i.e., trigram overlap.
Table 3. Quantitative evaluation using generated emails
Model Perplexity Coherence TrigramOverlap (%)
Generatorword 8.97 2.8 43.7
Generatorsentence 4.59 4.9 66.8
The results of the evaluation have been
presented using a dataset of 100 generated
emails. The coherence measure has been
calculated based on the language model built using
the Brown Corpus7 available with NLTK package
7https://www.nltk.org/book/ch02.html
in Python. We use a list of top 1000 most
common trigrams in the legitimate emails dataset
for the calculation of our trigram overlap. We
observe an increased measure of coherence as
well as occurence of common trigrams in the
emails generated by the sentence based models.
4.2.2 Qualitative Evaluation
The most simplistic form of qualitative evaluation is
observing the nature of randomly selected samples
from the generated text. We have defined common
malicious cues in Section 2.1. Drawing motivation
from Table 1, we inspect the generated email
content for signs of obvious malign intent as well
as other prominent features which can be used to
evaluate our system performance.
Here, we include two samples each, generated
using the word-based model and the hierarchical
model at different temperatures for the purpose
of our analysis. One noticeable feature of the
emails generated by the systems is the number of
sentences in the samples. While the more genuine
looking samples selected from the outputs of the
Generatorsentence model tend to be longer i.e.,
consists of more than one sentence, the samples
from the baseline model (Generatorword) are
comparably more terse. Also, longer sequences
from the deep generation model generated at a
higher τ tend to include more ent tags at random
places within the text.
(A) Samples generated by Generatorword:
A1. Sampling at τ = 0.9: ent Could
you give me a moment for why I would
appreciate everyone’s support . ent Best
wishes, ent
A2. Sampling at τ = 0.5: Hi , I hope you
are having a good ent interview. ent
(B) Samples generated using
Generatorsentence:
B1. Sampling at τ = 0.5: Yes . We had ent
them to set up a date . ent We are now in
London on Monday for Christmas.
B2. Sampling at τ = 1.0: Hi ? ent What
do you have the steps or makes it a minute.
ent P.S. You can ent email ent with changes
to a reports that ent has delivered several to
the members with the office
Human Evaluation. While automated quali-
tative and quantitative evaluation methods seem
believable, these measures just paint half the
picture. One of the main contributions of proactive
research in cybersecurity involve strengthening
humans/individuals using the web and internet.
Since humans are considered the weakest link in
security research, we evaluate the efficacy of these
fake emails by conducting a human evaluation
study.
We provide our 6 participants with a survey of 24
email bodies. For each email body, the participants
are required to rate the quality of the email content
based on three attributes - syntactical correctness,
coherency and fluency. The scores for each of
these attributes are based on a Likert scale ∈
[1,5]. We also ask each participant to identify
whether the email body is legitimate or not -
which requires a yes/no response. Of the 24
email bodies, 12 emails are genuine or manually
written and the rest are fake or system generated
emails. Of the 12 system generated emails, we
consider 7 emails which are generated by our
sentence selection model (Generatedsentence) and
5 emails generated by our baseline word prediction
model (Generatedword). We choose a balanced
ratio to discern the effectiveness of our human
participants in detecting fake emails from their
genuine counterparts.
Table 4 demonstrates the results of the human
evaluation setup. We report the scores for
syntax, coherency and fluency, averaged across
all participants, on the combined set of system
generated emails - Generatedall. We also report
the same on the subset of emails generated by
each of the baseline and deep generation models -
Generatorword and Generatedsentence respectively,
to compare the difference in system performance.
We also report the scores on the combined
set of system generated emails - Generatedall.
We further compare the statistical significance
between the results on the manually written emails
(Truth in Table 4) with Generatedall - syntax: 4.01
(p− value = 0.1377), coherency: 3.31 (p− value <
10−5) and fluency: 3.19 (p − value < 10−5). We
observe that while the difference in syntax scores
between the legitimate and generated email bodies
are not statistically significant,8 the generated
content is still behind in terms of coherency and
fluency. However, in contrast, we observe that our
human participants tend to have a low detection
rate (≈57%) when it comes to generated emails,
as observed in Table 4, with the detection rate
dropping to approximately 38% in case of emails
generated by the sentence selection model. We
also include the mean and standard deviation in
the number of words (W , SDW ) and sentences (S,
SDS) in the generated and the manually written
emails used in our survey.
5 Related Work
The need to counter the active attacker issue has
given rise to proactive research methods. While
there exists classical techniques for phishing email
detection [41], [6], [3], state-of-the-art malicious
email detectors fail to detect a sophisticated or
targeted attack. Riding on the wave of proactive
research, many researchers have delved deeper
into the realm of attack generation for different
attack vectors but none as serious as emails.
While the use of fully automated methods for text
generation has been considered, there have not
been much investigation into automatic modeling
of coherent emails which can be used for targeted
attacks.
5.1 Natural Language Generation
Use of deep neural networks have enabled
building fully (or partially, with feature engineering,)
automated models for natural language generation.
From the perspective of written text, a substantially
trained deep network is capable of emulating the
writing style of an individual. This property has
8p − value calculated using the Unpaired Two Samples
Wilcoxon test or Mann Whitney test
been leveraged in natural language research by
making deep learners write a wide variety of text
Shakespearean Sonnets [43], poetry [15], [45],
answer generation [28].
While the use of grammar [2], templates [7], [8]
and statistical language based models (e.g.
N-grams [17]) are popular, Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNNs) have been shown to be a
more suitable choice owing to their ability to
learn dependencies across the textual context [18].
Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) networks are
more suitable for longer text sequences. However,
while a fully automated system seems lucrative -
controlling the coherency, topic and structure of the
generated text can be quite challenging.
Using RNNs for sequence-to-sequence learning
is a popular practice for text generation as shown
in [13], [46], [31], [23]. Since, simple encoder-
decoder architectures fail to model important
or meaningful words and phrases, [24], [13]
use attention based encoder-decoder models for
preserving coherence and context in the generated
text. Other generation techniques include deep
learning with Markov Models [42], variational
auto-encoders [32], generative adversarial net-
works [30]. While the aforementioned research
works experiment with the architectures, such
strategies are prone to generating incoherent
content as the length of the generated text
increases. The architecture used in this paper
attempts at fixing this issue at a more global level -
by implementing coherence in each sentence and
then selecting the best sentence to be included in
the generated text.
5.2 Attack Generation
Growth in the field of proactive research has
become more prominent in an effort to counter
active attackers. Phishing is a largely unsolved
cyber threat, worsened more by the proliferation
in spear-phishing attacks. The ability of the
perpetrators to deceive an individual by behaving
as a legitimate entity can be automated for
widespread social engineering attacks as studied
in [29] and [22]. Researchers in [2], [9], [16],
look at ‘weaponinizing’ advanced machine learning
techniques to launch sophisticated yet automated
Table 4. Human evaluation results on the automated and true emails. Scores for Syntax (Syn), Coherency (Coh) and
Fluency (Flu) vary between [1, 5]. Detection Rate has been reported as a percentage
Email Content Scores DetectionRate W SDW S SDSSyn Coh Flu
Generatedword 3.63 2.8 2.6 83.33 12 2.88 1.2 0.45
Generatedsentence 4.29 3.67 3.62 38.09 13 6.21 2 0.81
Generatedall 4.01 3.31 3.19 56.94 12 5 2 0.78
Truth 4.42 4.56 4.47 75 24 14.8 3 0.94
targeted attacks. While [2] uses a grammar-based
approach for synthetic email generation; Das et.
al. [9] uses a more automated deep neural network
for email generation, which suffers from incongruity
in the generated context as shown by their
evaluation. Other studies in an adversarial setting,
which leverage natural language techniques, have
been pursued in spreading malicious Twitter
messages [33], generating malicious URLs [1],
generation of fake reviews [44] as well as text
messages [35]. Automated means of synthesizing
sophisticated attack vectors reduces the manual
labor and provide phishers an opportunity to launch
targeted attacks on a much larger scale and
magnitude. This in turn increases the chances of
succeeding in an attack.
5.3 Emails as Attack Vectors
Emails are the most common and preferred
method for social engineering attacks. [11]
describes the modus operandi and the structure of
a common phishing email. Researchers have also
delved deeper into the attributes and underlying
psychological features that cause phishing and
social engineering attacks to be successful in [14],
[34], [16]. Techniques for automatic generation of
synthetic emails have been discussed in [2], [7], but
introducing attributes of deception into legitimate
emails is a non-trivial task [9], [5], [29].
6 Discussion and Conclusions
We revisit two major error trends observed in
the evaluation of our word and character based
generation models. First, repetitions of tags and
words in the generated text body. A sample
sentence generated by the word-based language
model - “The corres ent ent ent Also ent , ent
I we can operating a gift to ensure, are that
extent will is a links are not ent” - demonstrates
such behavior. While, we hypothesized such a
behavior at larger text lengths, the brittleness in
a model which uses characters or words as units
for text generation can be observed for shorter text
sequence generation as well. We believe, that the
nature of the input on which the system is being
modeled and the temperature (τ ) parameter used
for sample generation play an important role in this
behavior of the predictive model.
While the RNN model generated text with ‘some’
malicious intent in them - the examples shown
above are just a few steps from being coherent
and congruous. We designed an RNN based text
generation system for generating targeted attack
emails which is a challenging task in itself and a
novel approach to the best of our knowledge. The
examples generated however suffer from random
strings and grammatical errors. We identify a
few areas of improvement for the deep generation
system - reduction of repetitive content as well as
inclusion of more legitimate and phishing examples
for analysis and model training. We would also like
to experiment with addition of topics and tags like
‘bank account’, ‘paypal’, ‘password renewal’, etc.
which may help generate more specific emails. It
would be interesting to see how a generative RNN
handles topic based email generation problem.
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